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Never underestimate the willingness of the American
public to tell you about itself.
Direct Marketing Executive
In Truro, Mass. at the end of 2004, police politely asked all male residents to provide a DNA
sample to match with DNA material found at the scene of an unsolved murder. Residents were
approached in a non-threatening manner and asked to help solve the crime. This tactic of
rounding up all the usual suspects (and then some) is still rare in the United States for historical,
legal, and logistical reasons, but it is becoming more common. The Truro case illustrates
expanding trends in surveillance and social control.
There is increased reliance on “soft” means for collecting personal information. In criminal
justice contexts these means involve some or all of the following:  persuasion to gain voluntary
compliance, universality or at least increased inclusiveness, and emphasis on the needs of the
community relative to the rights of the individual.
As with other new forms of surveillance and detection, the process of gathering the DNA
information is quick and painless, involving a mouth swab, and is generally not felt to be
invasive. This makes such requests seem harmless relative to the experience of having blood
drawn, having an observer watch while a urine drug sample is produced, or being patted down or
undergoing a more probing physical search.
In contrast, more traditional police methods such as an arrest, a custodial interrogation, a search,
a subpoena or traffic stop are “hard.” They involve coercion and threat to gain involuntary
compliance. They may also involve a crossing of intimate personal borders, as with a strip or
body cavity search. In principle such means are restricted by law and policy to persons there are
reasons to suspect, --thus implicitly recognizing the liberty of the individual relative to the needs
of the community.
Yet the culture of social control is changing. While hard forms of control are hardly receding, the
soft forms are expanding in a variety of ways. I note several forms of this – requesting volunteers
based on appeals to good citizenship or patriotism; using disingenuous communication; profiling
based on life style and consumption; and utilizing hidden or low visibility information collection
techniques.
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The theme of volunteering as good citizenship or patriotism can increasingly be seen in other
contexts. Consider a Justice Department “Watch Your Car” program found in many states.
Decals which car owners place on their vehicles serve as an invitation to police anywhere in the
United States to stop the car if driven late at night.
A related form of volunteerism involves using citizens as adjuncts to law enforcement by
watching others. Beyond the traditional Neighborhood Watch, we can note new post-9/11
programs, such as a police sponsored C.A.T. EYES (Community Anti-Terrorism Training
Initiative) and efforts to encourage truckers, utility workers, taxi drivers, and delivery persons to
report suspicious activity.
There also appears to be an increase in Federal prosecutors asking corporations under
investigation to waive their attorney/client privilege. This can provide information that is not
otherwise available--at a cost of indicting only lower level personnel. Plea bargaining shares a
similar logic of coercive “volunteering”, often hidden under a judicially sanctified and sanitized
veneer of disguised coercion.
Another “soft” method involves disingenuous communication that seeks to create the impression
that one is volunteering when that isn’t the case. Consider:
--the ubiquitous building signs, “In entering here you have agreed to be searched.”
--a message from the Social Security Administration to potential recipients: “While it
is voluntary for you to furnish this information, we may not be able to pay benefits to
your spouse unless you give us the information.”
--a Canadian airport announcement: “Notice: Security measures are being taken to
observe and inspect persons. No passengers are obliged to submit to a search of
persons or goods if they choose not to board our aircraft.”
A related form of soft surveillance involves corporations more than government. Note the
implicit bargain with respect to technologies of consumption in which the collection of
personally identifiable (and often subsequently marketed) information is built into the very
activity. We gladly, if often barely consciously, give up this information in return for the ease of
buying and communicating and the seductions of frequent flyer and other reward programs.
Information collection is unseen and automated (in a favored engineering goal, “the human is out
of the loop”), generating the appearance of actions that are neutral and objective and ignoring the
choices inherent in the design of the system. Data gathering is “naturally” folded into routine
activities such as driving a car, watching television, or using a credit card, computer, or
telephone.
Consider also those who agree to report their consumption behavior and attitudes in more detail
as part of market research. A new variant goes beyond the traditional paid “volunteers” of the
Nielsen ratings and other consumer research. Volunteers are given free samples and talking
points. They seek to create “buzz” about new products without revealing their connection to the
sponsoring business. Procter and Gamble for example has 240,000 volunteers in its teenage
product propaganda/diffusion network. While many call, few are chosen (10-15%) for this highly
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coveted role1. These volunteer intelligence and marketing agents report on their own and others’
responses to products, take surveys, and participate in focus groups.
What is at stake here isn’t merely improved advertising in intensely competitive industries but
also a new and morally ambiguous form of tattling.  Regardless of whether they are compensated,
the providers of information to marketing research, are also volunteering information on those
sharing their characteristics and experiences. However no permission and no direct benefits flow
to the mass of persons the sponsoring agency learns about.There are parallels to DNA analysis
here: an individual who voluntarily offers his or her information also simultaneously offers
information on family members who have not agreed to this. We lack an adequate conceptual,
ethical, and legal framework for considering this spill over effect from voluntary to involuntary
disclosure involving third parties.
We can also note changes in a related cultural area, involving the willing, even gleeful public
exposure of private information --whether in dress styles, cell phone conversations, or the mass
media. Many Americans  are drawn to new communications technologies like nails to a magnet,
unable to resist the prurient call to watch others, but also with a near Dostoyevskian  compulsion
to offer information about themselves. There can also be psychological gratifications from
revelation for both the revealer and the recipient of the information.
The prying and often inane TV talk and reality shows, web cam pages, web blogs, the goofy
waving of fans at televised events, and video taping of conceptions, births, and last wills and
testaments suggest the extent to which we have become both a performance and a spectator
society –literally from the beginning of life to the end.
If You Don’t Have to Undress Are You Still Naked?
Searching  Made Easy
Many forms of voluntarism are encouraged by techniques designed to be less directly invasive.
Computers scan dispersed personal records for suspicious cases avoiding, at least initially, any direct
review by a human.  Similarly x-ray and scent machines “search” persons and goods for contraband
without touching them. .Inkless fingerprints can be taken without the stained thumb symbolic of the
arrested person. Classified government programs are said to permit the remote reading of computers
and their transmissions without the need to directly install a bugging device.
Beyond the ease of gathering DNA, consider the change from a urine drug test requiring an
observer, to those that require a strand of hair, sweat, or saliva. Saliva is particularly interesting.
Whatever can be revealed from the analysis of blood or urine is also potentially found (although in
smaller quantities) in saliva –not only evidence of disease and DNA, but also of drugs taken and
pregnancy. The recent development of nonelectrical sensors now make it possible to detect
molecules at minute levels in saliva. (New York Times, April 19, 2005).
It is likely to offer a wonderful illustration of the creeping (or better galloping) nature of personal
data collection that technical developments increasingly make possible. This involves both the
displacement of traditional invasive means and the expansion to new areas and users. To take
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blood, the body’s protective armor must be pierced.  But expectorating occurs easily and
frequently and is more “natural” than puncturing a vein. Nor does it involve the unwanted
observation required for a urine drug sample. Saliva samples can be almost endlessly taken, and
in charting changes make possible the early identification of problems.
This may offer medical diagnostic advantages to individuals who can maintain control over the
content of their spit. Yet employers concerned with rising health costs and resistance to urine
drug tests--and eager to avoid liability for the illnesses of those who work around hazardous
chemicals --would also have a strong interest in diagnostic spitting as a condition of employment.
Authorities concerned with identifying those who spit when not requested to, can also use the
technology. The transit authority in Sheffield, England, as part of an anti-spitting campaign
distributed 3000 DNA swab kits to transportation staff.  Posters proclaim “Spit It’s Out” and warn
persons who spit that “…you can be traced and prosecuted. Even if we don’t know what you look
like. And your record will be on the national DNA data base. Forever”.  For those of another era,
this is reminiscent of the grammar school teachers who threatened to add notes about misbehavior to
“your permanent record”.
The automated analysis of urine offers many of the advantages of saliva. A diagnostic test
routinely used in some Japanese employment contexts requires that each time an employee enters
the stall they be identified through their access card. This permits a comprehensive record of their
flushed offerings over time. It is said to be of great benefit in the early diagnosis of health
problems, it can also determine drug use, recent sexual activity and pregnancy.
In many of these cases citizens are at least informed of what is going on, even if the meaning of
their consent is open to question. More troubling is the development of tactics that need not rely
on the subject consenting or even being informed. New hidden or low visibility technologies
increasingly offer the tempting possibility of by-passing awareness, and thus any need for direct
consent, altogether.
Consider technologies that overcome traditional barriers such as darkness or walls. Night vision
technology illuminates what darkness traditionally protected (and the technology is itself
protected unlike an illuminated spotlight). Thermal imaging technology applied from outside can
offer a rough picture of a building’s interior based on heat patterns, without the necessity of
entering.
A person’s DNA can be collected from a drinking glass or from discarded dental floss. Facial
scanning technology only requires a tiny lens. Smart machines can “smell” contraband with no
need for a warrant or asking subjects if it is permissible to invade their olfactory space or “see”
through their clothes and luggage. Beyond the traditional reading of visual clues offered by facial
expression, there are claims that the covert analysis of heat patterns around the eyes and of
tremors in the voice, and the measurement of brain wave patterns, offer windows into feelings
and truth telling. The face still remains a tool for protecting inner feelings and thoughts, but for
how long?
Individuals need not be informed that their communications devices, vehicles, wallet cards, and
consumer items increasingly will have RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) chips embedded in
them that can be designed to be passively read from up to 30 feet away by unseen sensors.
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In the convoluted logic of those who justify covert (or non-informed) data collection and use,
individuals “volunteer” their data by walking or driving on public streets or entering a shopping
mall, by failing to hide their faces or wear gloves or encrypt their communications, or by
choosing to use a phone, computer, or a credit card. The statement of a direct marketer nicely
illustrates this: “Never ever underestimate the willingness of the American public to tell you about
itself. That data belongs to us! ...it isn't out there because we stole it…Someone gave it away and
now it's out there for us to use.”
Yes, but…
In an environment of intense concern about crime and terrorism and a legal framework generated
in a far simpler time, the developments discussed above are hardly surprising. Democratic
governments need to be reasonably effective and to maintain their legitimacy (even as research
on the complex relationships between effectiveness and legitimacy is needed). Working together
and sacrificing a bit of oneself for the common good, particularly in times of crisis, is hardly
controversial. Relative to traditional authoritarian settings, many of the above examples show
respect for the person in offering notice and some degree of choice and in minimizing
invasiveness. Such efforts draw on the higher civic traditions of democratic participation, self-
help, and community. They may also deter. Yet there is also something troubling about them.
The accompanying rhetoric is often dishonest and even insulting to one’s intelligence. Consider a
phone company executive who, in defense of unblockable Caller-Id, said, “When you choose to
make a phone call you are choosing to release your telephone number.”  In the same World Cup
League of Disingenuity is the statement of a personnel manager in a one-industry town, “We
don’t require anyone to take a drug test, only those who choose to work here.”
To be meaningful, choice should imply genuine alternatives and refusal costs that are not wildly
exorbitant. Absent that, we have trickery, double-talk, and the frequently spoiled fruit of
inequitable relationships.
When we are told that for the good of the community we must voluntarily submit to searches or
provide information, there is a danger of the tyranny of the communal and of turning
presumptions of innocence upside down. If only the guilty need worry, why bother with a Bill of
Rights and other limits on authority? There also comes a point beyond which social pressure
seems unreasonable. If the case for categorical information is strong, then the law ought to
require it without need of the verbal jujitsu of asking for volunteers or arguing that subjects are in
fact taking voluntary action in the full meaning of the term, when they aren’t.
Those who fail to volunteer can be viewed as having something to hide, or as being bad citizens
and uncooperative team players. The positive reasons for rejecting such requests are ignored.  Yet
we all have things to hide, or more properly to reveal only selectively, depending on the relationship
and context. The general social value we place on sealed first class letters, window blinds, and
bathroom doors, and our opposition to indiscriminant wiretapping, bugging, and informing, or to
giving up anonymity in public places (absent cause), are hardly driven by an interest in aiding the
guilty. Sealing juvenile criminal records does not reflect a perverse strategy for infiltrating
miscreants into adult life, but rather an understanding of, and some compassion for, the mistakes of
youth.
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We value privacy not to protect wrongdoing, but because an appropriate degree of control over
personal and social information is central to our sense of self, autonomy, and material well being-
-as well as being necessary for independent group actions. A healthy, if necessarily qualified,
suspicion of authority is also a factor in restricting information sought by the more powerful. As
consumers and citizens we have an interest in avoiding the manipulation, discrimination, and
theft that can flow from combining bits of personal information that are innocuous when standing
alone.
Many of the new controls may seem more acceptable (or at least are less likely to be challenged)
because they are hidden or built-in and less invasive relative to the traditional forms of crossing
personal and physical borders. We are also often complicit in their application --whether out of
fear, convenience, or for frequent shopper awards. Converting privacy to a commodity in which
the seller receives something in return to compensate for the invasion is a clever and defensible
means of overcoming resistance.
Exchanges and less invasive searches are certainly preferable to data rip-offs and more invasive
searches. However the nature of the means should not be determinative. What matters most is the
appropriateness of collecting the information and only secondarily the way that it is collected. A
search is still a search regardless of how it is carried out. The issue of searches and the crossing
of traditional borders between the civil and state sectors, or the self and others, involves much
more than painless, quick, inexpensive (or positively rewarding), and non-embarrassing means.
Certainly other factors being equal, soft ways are to be preferred to hard, even if the
control/instrumental goals of those applying the surveillance remain the same. Yet coercion at
least has the virtue (if that’s what it is) of letting the subject (or object) know what is happening.
What we don’t know can hurt us as well.
Unhappy Underlaps
Traditionally (if accidentally) there was a happy overlap between three factors that limited
searches and protected personal information. The first was logistical. It was not cost- or time-
effective to search everyone. The second was law. More invasive searches were prohibited or
inadmissable, absent cause and a warrant.  The third reflected the effrontery experienced in our
culture when certain personal borders were involuntarily crossed (e.g., strip and body cavity
searches and taking body fluids, and to a lesser degree, even fingerprints. Limited resources, the
unpleasantness of invasive searchers (for both the searched and the searcher) and the ethos of a
democratic society historically restricted searches.
These supports are no longer overlapping. Instead they are being undermined by the mass
media’s encouragement of fear and perceptions of crises2 and by the seductiveness of
consumption --together with the development of inexpensive, less invasive broad searching tools.
Under these conditions one does not need a meteorologist to describe wind patterns.
The willingness to offer personal information and the fascination with the private aspects of
other’s lives partly ties to the 1960s legacy of openness and transparency as it encounters the new
technological possibilities. But it also speaks to some need of the modern person (and perhaps in
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particular the American) to see and be seen and to know and be known about through the
ubiquitous camera and related means.
Volunteering one’s data and being digitally recorded and tracked is coming to be taken for
granted as a means of asserting selfhood. This willful blurring of some of the lines between the
public and private self and the ready availability of technologies to transmit and receive personal
data give new meaning to David Riesman’s concern with “other direction”3.
Of course our sense of self and social participation have always depended on validation from
others--on seeing ourselves in, and through, their eyes. But contemporary forms of validation
induce a sense of pseudo-authenticity, an unbecoming narcissism, and a suspicious spy culture.
The social functions of reticence and embarrassment, and the role of withheld personal
information as a currency of trust, friendship and intimacy, are greatly weakened.
The abundance of new opportunities for self-expression offered by contemporary technologies
must be considered alongside the lessened control we have of information in distant computer
systems. Data shadows or ghosts based on tangents of personal information (stripped of context)
increasingly effect our life chances. The subject often has little knowledge of the existence or
consequences of these data bases and of how they are constructed or might be challenged.
This complicated issue of reducing the richness of personal and social contexts to a limited
number of variables is at the core of science’s ability to predict; it is central to current ideas about
economic competitiveness. The data analyst goes from known empirical cases to equivalent cases
that are not directly known. Because a given case can be classified relative to a statistical model
as involving a high or low risk, it is presumed to be understood and thus controllable (at least on
a statistical or “probabilistic” bases). This may work fine for business or medical decisions, but
civil liberties and civil rights are not based on statistical categories. They are presumed to be
universally applicable absent cause to deny them. So rationality and efficiency increasingly clash
with many of our basic Enlightenment ideas of individualism and dignity --ideas that were better
articulated and less contestable, in technologically simpler times.
There is a chilling and endless regress quality in our drift into a society where you have to
provide ever more personal information in order to prove that you are the kind of person who
does not merit even more intensive scrutiny. Here we confront the insatiable information appetite
generated by scientific knowledge in a risk-adverse society. In such a society knowing more may
only serve to increase doubt and the need for more information.
My concern is more with cultural and behavioral developments than with the law. Certainly we
do not lack for contemporary examples of constricted or trampled legal rights (e.g., American
citizens held at Guantanamo without trial or the unwelcome elements of the Patriot Act). Still, the
growing institutionalization of civil rights and civil liberties over the last century (involving race,
gender, children, work, freedom of expression and association, searches, and life styles) is
unlikely to be reversed.  Jagged cycles rather than clean linearity will continue to characterize
this turbulent history. Wartime restrictions (whether Lincoln’s suspending of habeas corpus or
limits on speech during WW II) have been lifted as calmer times returned. To be sure the
evidence of ebbs is undeniable, but even in the shadow of  9/11 there are some flows as well,
particularly at the state and local level.
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The cultural changes are worrisome because they are diffuse, subtle, and unseen—and they often
reflect choices that, even if specious or manipulated, are difficult to challenge in a democratic
society. The possibility of wrongful choice is an inherent risk of democracy.
One’s liberty can be used to smoke, eat rich foods, drive environmentally unfriendly cars, and
watch unreality television, as well as to volunteer personal information –whether to government
or the commercial sector. A bad law can be challenged in court or repealed. A dangerous
technology can be banned, regulated, or countered with a different technology. But the only way
to respond to liberty threatening choices of the kind discussed here is through dialogue and
education (tools that are already disproportionately available to those supporting the current
developments).
Is it Happening Here?
Contrary to the familiar Orwellian concerns about the all knowing eyes and ears of government,
recent history suggests to some observers the reverse problem--blindness, deafness, and
inefficiency  (eg., the 9/11 danger known only in retrospect, the failure of various airline
passenger screening programs, wrongful convictions and so on). In one sense, there are two
problems with the new surveillance technologies. One is that they don’t work and the other is that
they work too well.  If the first, they fail to prevent disasters, bring miscarriages of justice, and
waste resources. If the second, they can further inequality and invidious social categorization;
they chill liberty. These twin threats are part of the enduring paradox of democratic government
that must be strong enough to maintain reasonable order, but not so strong as to become
undemocratic.
The surveillance developments noted here are consistent with the strengthening of the neo-liberal
ethos of the last decade. The idea of voluntary compliance valorizes increased individual choices,
costs, and risks. It simultaneously weakens many social protections and pays less attention to the
ways the social order produces bad choices and collective problems. The consequences of these
are then left to individual and private solutions. This generates a suspicious society in which
paranoia is entangled with reality.
There is no single answer to how the new personal information collection techniques ought to be
viewed and what, if anything, should (or can) be done about them. From genuine to mandatory
voluntarism and from open to secret data collection—these are points on continuums.  There are
important moral differences between what can be known through the unaided senses and what
can only be known through technologically enhanced senses. The moral and practical issues
around the initial collection of information are distinct from its subsequent uses and protections.
Diverse settings--national security, domestic law enforcement, public order maintenance, health
and welfare, commerce, banking, insurance, public and private spaces and roles--do not allow for
the rigid application of the same policies. The different roles of employer-employee, merchant-
consumer, landlord-renter, police-suspect, and health provider-patient involve legitimate conflicts
of interests. Any social practice is likely to involve conflict of values.
We need a situational or contextual perspective that acknowledges the richness of different
contexts, as well as the multiplicity of conflicting values within and across them.
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In the face of the simplistic rhetoric of polarized ideologues in dangerous times, we need
attention to trade offs and to the appropriate weighing of conflicting values. Given changing
historical circumstances, there is no fixed golden balance point. However the procedures for
accountability and oversight so central to the founding and endurance of the country must remain
strong. Contemporary moral-panic efforts to erode these need to be strenuously resisted.
It would be foolish to elevate consent to an absolute, but neither should we continue to slide into
a world where meaningful consent is only of historical interest. At best we can hope to find a
compass rather than a map and a moving equilibrium rather than a fixed point for decision
making. .
Appreciating complexity is surely a virtue, but being immobilized by it is not. The default
position should be meaningful consent, absent strong grounds for avoiding it. Consent involves
participants who are fully appraised of the surveillance system’s presence and potential risks, and
of the conditions under which it operates. Consent obtained through deception or unreasonable or
exploitative seduction or to avoid dire consequences is hardly consent. The smile that
accompanies the statement, “an offer you can’t refuse” reflects that understanding.
A principle of truth in volunteering is needed: it is far better to say clearly that “as a condition of
[entering here, working here, receiving this benefit, etc.] we require that you provide personal
information”. A golden rule principle ought also to apply: Would the information collector be
comfortable in being the subject, rather than the agent of surveillance, if the situation were
reversed?  These are among 20 broad questions and related principles that I suggest be asked in
any assessment of personal information collection4.
Our culture needs to overcome the polite tendency to acquiesce when we are inappropriately
asked for personal information. We need to just say “no” –when, after paying with a credit card, a
cashier asks for a phone number, or when a web page or warranty form asks for irrelevant
personal information, or a video store seeks a social security number. Offering disinformation
may sometimes be appropriate. The junk mail I receive for Groucho and Karl offers a laugh, and
a means of tracking the erroneous information I sometimes provide.
Finally, technology needs to be seen as an opportunity, rather than only as a problem.
Technologies can be designed to protect personal information and notify individuals when their
information is collected or has been compromised. Thus electronic silencers can inhibit third
parties from overhearing cell phone and face-to face-conversations and computer privacy screens
can block sneaky peeks by anyone not directly in front of the screen. E-ZPass toll collection
systems can be programmed to deduct payment, while protecting the anonymity of the driver.
RFID technology can build in notification by requiring that the chip make physical contact with
the sensor (e.g., touching the card or item to the sensor), rather than permitting it to be read
covertly at a distance. Cell phones cameras could be designed to emit a tell tale sound before a
picture is taken, (this is required in Japan).
From one perspective using  technology to protect one’s personal information may offer legal
support for an expectation of privacy. In Kyllo v. United States, a case involving the legality of a
search warrant based on evidence from thermal imaging technology, the dissenting judges argued
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that because the suspect did not take any actions to block the heat emissions that passed through
his roof from his marijuana grow lights,  he did not have an expectation of privacy. There thus is
no Fourth Amendment issue and the police action should not require a warrant. This collapsing of
what can be done with what is right involves an inverted logic, --once a technology becomes
widely available and is well known, responsibility for protection shifts legally (as well of course
as practically) to the individual, not to those who would cross personal borders. In failing to act
in response to changed circumstances beyond his or her control, the individual is seen to be
making a choice and in a sense again volunteers to be searched.
This blame the victim caveat subjectus logic cries out for a cartoon entitled, “where will it end?”
Beyond the paper shredder which has become routine in many homes, the cartoon would show a
citizen protecting privacy by always wearing gloves, a mask and perfume; having a closely
shaved head; talking in code and encrypting all communications; insulating one’s home, office
and packages in thermal image resistant tin foil and only using restrooms certified to be
monitoring free.
Sinclair Lewis hoped in 1935 that It Can’t Happen Here5. But of course it can and in some ways
it has. Twenty years ago in reflections on the year and book 1984, I wrote in these pages,
The first task of a society that would have liberty and privacy is to guard against the
misuse of physical coercion by the state and private parties. The second task is to
guard against the softer forms of secret and manipulative control. Because these are
often subtle, indirect, invisible, diffuse, deceptive, and shrouded in benign
justifications, this is clearly the more difficult task.
Two decades later the hot button cultural themes of threat, civil order, and security that Lewis
emphasized are in greater ascendance and have been joined by the siren calls of consumption. If
our traditional notions of liberty disappear, it will not be because of a sudden coup d’etat. Nor
will the iron technologies of industrialization be the central means. Rather it will occur by
accretion and with an appeal to traditional American values in a Teflon and sugar-coated
technological context of low visibility, fear, and convenience.
                                          
5 See: LEWIS,  S., It Can’t Happen Here, New York, Signet Classics, 1995.
